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RACE AND THE LAW: THE VISIBLE AND THE INVISIBLE

“I am an invisible man.”

–Ralph Ellison1

“I don’t see color. People tell me I’m white and I believe them because
police call me ‘sir.’”
–Stephen Colbert 2
I.

INTRODUCTION

Sometimes the law “sees” race, and sometimes it does not. Sometimes it
recognizes race as legally relevant, in other words, and sometimes it does not. Over
the centuries, American law has always shown a keen awareness of race as a social
fact, but that awareness has not determined when and how the law made that social
fact legally relevant. The pivotal questions are when, how, to what extent, and for
what purposes does the law decide to “see” or not “see” race.3
This essay is divided into seven parts. Part II surveys the period from the
seventeenth century to the Civil War and shows that the concept of “race” was evident
as a central part of formal American law. Part III discusses the period from the Civil
War to World War II and identifies how the law continued to see “race” and accept it
as a valid basis for racial discrimination despite the passage of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Part IV addresses the social and cultural
changes that followed World War II and the Warren Court’s pathbreaking equal
protection decisions which began to see “race” anew as a legal category that violated
the Constitution when used for unjust and “invidious” purposes.
Part V examines the period from the 1970s to the present when opposition to the
civil rights movement hardened and spurred the idea that law should never “see” race
as a valid legal category but instead be entirely “colorblind,” thus suggesting the
problematic nature and the partisan political uses that the “colorblind” idea inspired.
Part VI examines in detail some of the ways that “colorblind” law, by refusing to
“see” race, allows and even encourages the continuation of much de facto racial
discrimination and inequality. The essay concludes with Part VII by briefly marking
the continuing political struggle between those who insist on a “colorblind” law and
those who understand that such an insistence often serves to obscure the
discriminatory nature of many of the law’s operations and consequences.

1.

Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man 3 (Vintage Books 1972) (1952).

2.

The Colbert Report: Ending Racism (Comedy Central television broadcast Feb. 1, 2007).

3.

“[T]o truly understand America, we must open our eyes to the hidden work of a caste system that has
gone unnamed but prevails among us to our collective detriment . . . .” Isabel Wilkerson, Caste 30
(2020). On the issue of what the law “sees,” see Kris Franklin, Meditations on Teaching What Isn’t:
Theorizing the Invisible in Law and Law School, 66 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 387, 392–96 (2021–2022).
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II. EXPLOITING RACIAL VISIBILITY: LAW AS CLEAR-EYED AND REPRESSIVE

Race became central to American law in the second half of the seventeenth
century when African slavery was formally established and legally enforced
throughout England’s North American colonies.4 In the 1660s, Virginia and
Maryland passed statutes, the “slave codes,” recognizing the lawfulness of Black
slavery,5 and by century’s end, almost all of the other colonies had accepted that legal
principle.6 Slave codes existed throughout the South and in New England, New
Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania.7
Along with the legalization of slavery came other forms of legalized racial
discrimination against Blacks, including those who were legally “free.” An early
statute prohibited fornication between “negroes” and “Christians,”8 for example, and
in 1691, Virginia criminalized all interracial sexual acts.9 In the following decades,
most colonies followed suit, criminalizing interracial marriage between whites and
those identified variously as “negroes,” “mulattoes,” and “Indians.”10 Other colonial
laws prohibited “free” Blacks from carrying handguns; gathering in groups; dancing
after dark, traveling without permission, and associating with slaves; and speaking
insolently to white persons.11
The American Revolution and the Declaration of Independence brought little
change, and the Constitution essentially ratified the racial status quo. At the
Constitutional Convention disagreements over the institution of slavery divided the
“free” and “slave” states, but the participants reached a compromise that recognized
race-based slavery even though they refused to identify it by name, making both
4.

Joshua J. Mark, Virginia Slave Laws and Development of Colonial American Slavery, World Hist. Encyc.
(Apr. 27, 2021), https://www.worldhistory.org/article/1740/virginia-slave-laws-and-development-ofcolonial-am/.

5.

See generally 2 Hening’s Statutes at Large 170, 260, 266, 270 (New York, William Waller Hening
ed., 1823) (collecting Virginia slave laws from 1660 to 1682); Slave Act of 1664, 1664 Md. Laws 533–34
(repealed 1681).

6.

A. Leon Higginbotham Jr., Virginia Led the Way in Legal Oppression, Wash. Post (May 21, 1978),
https://w w w.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1978/05/21/virginia-led-the-way-in-legaloppression/664bcdf4-8aaf-475f-8ea7-eb597aee7ecd/; see also Edwin Olson, The Slave Code in Colonial
New York, 29 J. Negro Hist. 147, 147–48 (1944) (tracking slave codes throughout the South and in
New England, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania).

7.

Olson, supra note 6.

8.

2 Hening’s Statutes at Large, supra note 5, at 170.

9.

3 Hening’s Statutes at Large 86–88 (Philadelphia, William Waller Hening ed., 1823) (collecting
Virginia slave laws from 1684 to 1710).

10.

Id.

11.

E.g., 7 The Statutes at Large of South Carolina 353–54 (Columbia, S.C., David J. McCord ed.,
1840) (“[N]o negro or slave shall carry out of the limits of his master’s plantation any sort of gun or fire
arms, without his master, or some other white person by his order . . . .”); id. at 413 (on group gatherings);
2 Charles Gayarré, History of Louisiana 362, 365 (New York, Redfield 1854) (on dancing,
traveling, associating); Ariela J. Gross, What Blood Won’t Tell 4 (2010) (on speaking insolently);
Paul Finkelman, Slavery in the Courtroom 4 (1998) (same); Kathleen M. Brown, Good
Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs 195–97 (1996) (same).
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slavery and race, as formal constitutional matters, expressly protected but formally
invisible. The Constitution referred to African slaves obliquely by using the seemingly
neutral phrase, “Person held to Service or Labour,” and by distinguishing whites
from Black slaves by referring to the former as “free Persons” and to the latter as
“other Persons.”12 However many Founders disapproved of race-based slavery, they
drafted and ratified a constitution that accepted it under non-racial verbal masks.
Although the Founders were unwilling to mention race or slavery by name in the
Constitution, they had no such hesitation about doing either when they began to
enact ordinary legislation. One year after the Constitution’s ratification the First
Congress adopted the Naturalization Act of 1790 and declared that only “a free
white person” was eligible “to become a citizen.”13 Two years later in the Militia Act
of 1792, Congress again incorporated explicit racial discrimination into the law by
restricting militia service to the “free able-bodied white male citizen.”14 The following
year, it passed the first Fugitive Slave Act, authorizing the capture and return of
slaves who escaped their bonds.15
Under various labels and in a variety of ways both race and slavery remained
critical legal categories and grew steadily in importance until the Civil War. By the
early nineteenth century the law of race-based slavery had become well established,
elaborately detailed, and carefully applied by the judiciary.16 Federal courts frequently
determined the free or slave status of Blacks in ruling on issues arising under the
federal Fugitive Slave Act,17 while the slave states made their laws increasingly
explicit and repressive. In the 1820s, for example, South Carolina led other slave
states in passing Negro Seamen Acts mandating that free Black sailors aboard ships
from other states or countries be seized and imprisoned until their ships left port.18
Across the South, government-backed “slave patrols” vigorously enforced the region’s
slave system and its many race-based laws.19
Throughout the nation, moreover, the antebellum decades witnessed the
continuation and spread of legalized racial discrimination. “In virtually every phase of
existence,” North and South, “Negroes found themselves systematically separated
12.

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.

13.

Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795).

14.

Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (corresponds to Militia Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264) (repealed
1903).

15.

Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (repealed 1864). The statute did not refer explicitly to race,
but it employed the word “slave” repeatedly in its accompanying commentary. Id. Its caption used the
phrase “persons escaping from the service of their masters,” while its formal text used the facially neutral
terms “fugitive from justice” and “person held to labor.” Id.

16.

See Paul Finkelman, Supreme Injustice 220, 223 (2018).

17.

See, e.g., United States v. Copeland, 25 F. Cas. 646, 646 (C.C.D.C. 1862) (No. 14,865a) (applying the
Fugitive Slave Act to the District of Columbia to reject a fugitive’s habeas claim of unlawful custody).

18.

Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind Constitution 11 (1992).

19.

See, e.g., Sally E. Hadden, Slave Patrols 6 (2003).
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from whites.” 20 Formal laws excluded them from stagecoaches, steamships, and
railroad cars or restricted them to inferior Jim Crow sections. Eighteen state
constitutions classified Blacks as “dependents” with few rights,21 while the Illinois
Constitution of 1848 required its state legislature to “pass such laws as will effectively
prohibit free persons of color from immigrating to and settling in this State.”22 In
1850 Congress passed both a new and more stringent federal Fugitive Slave Act 23 and
the Oregon Donation Land Claim Act of 1850, 24 which extinguished Indian rights to
land in Oregon and made large tracts available to whites while explicitly excluding
Blacks and Hawaiians from the law’s largesse.25 Writing in the infamous Dred Scott
case in 1857, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney declared that the “negro African race” was
not a part of the “white race,” and therefore not part of the American people.26 Blacks
were “a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the
dominant race” and had “no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”27
Before the Civil War people in both the North and South, including many who
joined the anti-slavery Free-Soil and then Republican parties, 28 agreed that the
United States was properly a “[w]hite man’s country.”29 Antebellum American law
explicitly ratified and enforced that shared consensus.

20. Leon F. Litwack, North of Slavery 97 (1961).
21.

Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color 31 (1998); e.g., N.C. Const. of 1776,
art. I, § 3.3, amend. X (1835) (denying Blacks the right to vote); S.C. Const., art. 1, § 6 (1790)
(disqualifying non-whites from running for political office); Fla. Const., art. XVI, § 3 (1839) (granting
power to prohibit non-white immigration).

22.

Ill. Const. of 1848, art. XIV, § 1 (allowing for whites-only immigration); see also Jacobson, supra note
21, at 30–31 (noting racist language in the 1848 Illinois Constitution and its emphasis on the “whiteness”
of citizenship).

23.

Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864). For enforcement of the act, see Stanley
W. Campbell, The Slave Catchers 110–47 (1970).

24.

Oregon Donation Land Claim Act of 1850, ch. 76, 9 Stat. 496 (amended 1853).

25.

See William G. Robbins, Oregon Donation Land Law, Or. Encyc., https://www.oregonencyclopedia.
org/articles/oregon_donation_land_act/#.YRWRKdNKgUR (Feb. 2, 2021) (noting that some 30,000
whites arrived in Oregon within five years of the act’s passage).

26. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404–05 (1857) (enslaved party), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S.

Const. amend. XIV.

27.

Id.

28. The Free-Soil Party was a political party formed in 1848, during the pre–Civil War era to oppose the

expansion of slavery into western territories when existing political parties (the Democratic and Whig
parties) declined to do so. See Free Soil Party, Organizations, Papers Abraham Lincoln Digit. Libr.,
https://papersofabrahamlincoln.org/organizations/FR37924 (last visited Apr. 28, 2022). Short-lived
support caused Free-Soilers to help establish and then join the Republican Party in 1856. Id.

29. See Eugene H. Berwanger, The Frontier Against Slavery 125 (1967); Anthony Gronowicz,

Race and Class Politics in New York City Before the Civil War 132 (1997); Leonard L.
Richards, The Slave Power 32–46 (2000).
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III. QUALIFYING RACIAL VISIBILITY: LAW AS RACIALLY ASTIGMATIC

The Civil War changed many things, and for issues of race the passage of three
postwar constitutional amendments altered the formal law substantially. The
Thirteenth Amendment (ratified 1865) abolished the institution of slavery absolutely,
though it did not mention “race” or “color.”30 The Fourteenth Amendment (ratified
1868) extended constitutional rights to Blacks but similarly failed to mention “race”
or “color.”31 The Fifteenth Amendment (ratified 1870) provided that no citizen could
be deprived of the right to vote by reason of “race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.”32 That language marked the first time that the words “race” and “color”
appeared in the Constitution itself.
These three Civil War amendments created new legal mandates and consequently
raised new legal questions. One that all three of the new additions shared involved the
scope of the potentially vast powers conferred on Congress “to enforce” their varied
provisions.33 Congress did use those powers over the succeeding years, though far
more often it ignored them. The Court sometimes construed those powers broadly
and sometimes quite narrowly.34 As the politics and values of the nation changed in
the late nineteenth century, so too did the willingness of Congress to use those powers
30. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for

crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.”).

31.

Id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).

32.

Id. amend. XV, § 1. In the immediate wake of the Civil War most states found ways to prevent Blacks
from voting. Voting Rights for African Americans, Libr. Cong., https://www.loc.gov/classroom-materials/
elections/right-to-vote/voting-rights-for-african-americans/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2022). In Missouri,
for example, the state’s second constitution adopted in 1865 restricted the suffrage to “every white male
citizen of the United States, and every white male person of foreign birth, who may have declared his
intention to become a Citizen of the United States.” Mo. Const. of 1865, art. II, § 18; see also Walter
Johnson, The Broken Heart of America 151 (2020).

33.

U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 2 (“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.”); Id. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.”); Id. amend. XV, § 2 (“The Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”).

34. Compare Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1906) (reading the Thirteenth Amendment

narrowly to authorize congressional action only against actual slavery and involuntary servitude), and
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519, 528–29, 535–36 (1997) (reading the Fourteenth Amendment
narrowly to hold that Congress cannot create rights not yet recognized by the Court as protected under
the Free Exercise Clause), and United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 218 (1875) (reading the Fifteenth
Amendment narrowly so that Congress cannot legislate upon state elections unless to punish states that
refuse the vote of otherwise lawful voters on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude),
with Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437–43 (1968) (reading the Thirteenth Amendment
broadly to authorize congressional action against public and private practices that constitute a relic of
slavery), and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648–51, 648 n.8 (1966) (reading the Fourteenth
Amendment broadly to hold that congressional law can be enacted to correct state laws in conflict with
the Equal Protection Clause), and Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514, 518–19 (2000) (reading the
Fifteenth Amendment broadly to imply that Congress can protect against state voting measures that
discriminate on the basis of ancestry).
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and of the Court to approve their uses. For the most part the provisions of the postwar
amendments were little used and largely ignored well into the twentieth century.
Passage of the Thirteenth Amendment raised questions concerning the meaning
of “slavery and involuntary servitude” and whether those terms barred the legal
devices that Southern states developed to retain firm control over their freed Black
populations. So-called “Black codes” and facially neutral laws involving vagrancy,
sharecropping, penal labor, and employment contracts were vigorously enforced by
criminal sanctions and served in practice as effective tools to maintain discriminatory
and repressive racist regimes. 35 Eventually, those devices came under closer legal
scrutiny, but well into the twentieth century the Court failed to invalidate many of
them while occasionally striking down a few of the most egregious ones.36
The Fifteenth Amendment’s reference to “race” and “color” required the courts to
give meaning to concepts that would increasingly become awkward and contested.
Was “race,” for example, determined by physiognomy, skin color, biology, culture,
language, national origin, religion, economic and social status, or some imprecise
and unstable combination of some or all of those factors? In Plessy v. Ferguson in
1896, when the Court refused to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to protect Black
Americans from racial segregation, it acknowledged the uncertain meaning of “race”
and resolved the constitutional question with a classic avoidance technique.37 The
justices simply passed the legal determination of racial status to the states, knowing
full well the discriminatory racial results that would follow.
It is true that the question of the proportion of colored blood necessary to
constitute a colored person, as distinguished from a white person, is one upon
which there is a difference of opinion in the different states; some holding that
any visible admixture of [B]lack blood stamps the person as belonging to the
colored race; others, that it depends upon the preponderance of blood; and still
others, that the predominance of white blood must only be in the proportion of
three-fourths. But these are question to be determined under the laws of each
state . . . .38

The meaning of “race” continued to confront the Court into the late twentieth
century when the law’s residual references to the concept began to cause it acute
embarrassment. Two Reconstruction era federal civil rights statutes conferred on
Blacks the same rights “enjoyed” by persons or citizens who were “white.”39 Thus, the
statutes forced the Court to decide whether “whites” could take advantage of the
35.

See William P. Quigley, Reluctant Charity: Poor Laws in the Original Thirteen States, 31 U. Rich. L. Rev.
111, 115, 153, 172–75 (1997).

36. E.g., Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 243–45 (1911) (invalidating state criminal law imposing penalties

for violations of labor contracts as antithetical to the Thirteenth Amendment); Guinn v. United States,
238 U.S. 347, 364–65 (1915) (invalidating grandfather clause in state law designed to prevent Blacks
from voting as antithetical to the Fifteenth Amendment).

37.

163 U.S. 537, 548–49 (1896).

38. Id. at 552 (citations omitted).
39.

42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(a), 1982.
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provisions and, if so, who exactly was “white.”40 The Court could do no better than
rely on what it considered a vague nineteenth-century “common understanding” that
seemed to make every possible ethnic and national group a separate “race,” and it
consequently ruled that the statutes protected every such group, including “whites.”41
The Fourteenth Amendment created the most important and enduring problems.
One was the nature of the rights that were included within the phrase “privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States.”42 In the 1872 Slaughter-House Cases, the
Court construed the clause narrowly and held that it referred primarily to rights
controlled by the states, not the federal government.43 That holding essentially
neutered the clause and led to the second problem: a new attention to the amendment’s
Due Process Clause. By century’s end, that focus led to the emergence of “substantive”
due process, an idea that allowed the courts to invalidate governmental actions and
that took on different meanings over the years, and remained a disputed constitutional
issue into the twenty-first century.
A third problem arose from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause. Although the Court was sensitive to “equality” claims under the clause in
cases involving economic regulations,44 for almost a century after the amendment’s
ratification the Court gave it relatively little formal heed.45 Because the Equal
Protection Clause failed to refer to race specifically, and because classification is an
essential legislative tool, the Court construed the clause to make racial classifications,
like other classifications, a matter of their “reasonableness.”46 This gave federal and
state courts extensive discretion in applying the mandate of equal protection. For
nearly a century, the Supreme Court construed the clause only rarely and, when it
did so in cases involving racial discrimination, treated it with exceptional narrowness.
Generally, it found racially discriminatory laws “reasonable” and upheld them. It
accepted the proposition that the Equal Protection Clause allowed legally-enforced
racial segregation and the further proposition that the clause simply did not touch
40. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287 (1976) (holding that § 1981 applies

to white persons); Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (“[A] distinctive
physiognomy is not essential to qualify for § 1981 protection.”).

41.

Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613.

42.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

43.

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74–80 (1872).

44. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 60–62 (1905).
45.

As late as 1927, the Court denied a claim under the Equal Protection Clause and dismissed the provision
as “the usual last resort of constitutional arguments.” Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).

46. See, e.g., Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 235–39 (1911) (assessing the constitutionality of a labor law in

light of its “natural operation and effect”); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938) (suggesting that laws with explicit race-based distinctions should be presumed unconstitutional).
Usually, though, the Court just dismissed equal protection claims on grounds that states had broad powers
of classification that had long been accepted, and sometimes cited Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
E.g., Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 86–87 (1927) (relying on Plessy to justify Mississippi’s segregated
school system).
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large realms of both de facto and de jure racial discrimination, repression, and
abuse.47
Well into the twentieth century, then, the states continued to enforce racially
discriminatory laws as constitutionally “reasonable.” Many segregated their schools,
neighborhoods, and transportation facilities by law, while most authorized or at least
allowed all manners of racial discrimination in governmental practices, public
activities, and general services open to the public.48 In 1913, for example, when
Woodrow Wilson became president, his administration instituted formal racial
segregation in some departments of the national government.49 Many states,
especially in the South, adopted a variety of tactics to prevent Blacks from voting,
and state and federal courts commonly upheld their racially restrictive provisions and
practices.50 For its part, the Supreme Court moved only rarely, slowly, and erratically
to check the variety of racially abusive state laws that existed across the nation.51
So-called “anti-miscegenation” laws, which prohibited interracial marriages,
represented the most intensely emotional issue that stemmed from anti-Black racism.
They remained common throughout the nation and led to innumerable lawsuits
involving wills, inheritances, and other issues of family law. Repeatedly, courts and
other legal bodies decided such disputes by determining the “racial identity” of
parties.52 In the early 1950s thirty states still retained such laws on their books, and
as late as 1967 sixteen continued to do so.53
Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law was particularly noteworthy. The state’s
General Assembly strengthened it in 1924 by passing an “[a]ct to preserve racial
integrity.”54 The measure not only prohibited interracial marriage but also required
state and local authorities to maintain records identifying the racial composition of
the state’s population by officially classifying all of its citizens as “white” or “colored.”
In 1955 Virginia’s supreme court upheld the act’s constitutionality and defended it on
47.

For the classic case decided in 1896, see Plessy, 163 U.S. at 537. For later cases, see South Covington &
Cincinnati Street Railway Co. v. Kentucky, 252 U.S. 399, 403–04 (1920), in which the Court refused to
invalidate a racial segregation law dealing with street railways operating across state lines, and Gong
Lum, 275 U.S. at 87, in which the Court upheld the right of Mississippi to classify a Chinese girl as
“colored” and require her to attend a segregated Black school.

48. See generally Charles S. Mangum, Jr., The Legal Status of the Negro (1940) (examining court

opinions to discuss opportunities available to and denied Blacks).

49. Jennifer D. Keene, Wilson and Race Relations, in A Companion to Woodrow Wilson 133, 137 (Ross

A. Kennedy ed., 2013).

50. See, e.g., Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 48, 54 (1935); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486–88 (1903).
51.

The Court refused to overturn racial discrimination, for example, in Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 331
(1926), in the form of restrictive covenants in real property transactions. It also refused to void Texas’
“white primary” scheme, which in effect negated Black voting rights, in Grovey, 295 U.S. at 54–55.

52.

See Gross, supra note 11, at 4–7; Ian Haney López, White by Law 82–83 (1996).

53.

The states retaining such laws in 1967 were Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia, and West Virginia. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5 (1967) (citations omitted).

54. 1924 Va. Acts 534; Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 750 (Va. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
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grounds that it was designed “to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens” and
prevent “a mongrel breed of citizens” and “the obliteration of racial pride.”55 The
following year the U.S. Supreme Court, still bowing to racist pressures and fears,
refused to review the state court’s ruling on a ground that spoke resoundingly about
the political and cultural power of anti-Black racism in shaping the nation’s
constitutional law: The Court dismissed the case as “devoid of a properly presented
federal question.”56
Federal law also remained racist and discriminatory on its face. In 1882, for
example, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act and followed it with other
anti-Chinese enforcement measures.57 The government and the courts—including,
the Supreme Court58—enforced those laws with rigor, denying Chinese immigrants
entry and deporting thousands already in the country.59 Not until 1943 did Congress
repeal the act.60
More broadly, Congress retained the provision that the First Congress had
adopted in 1790 limiting naturalization to “free white person[s].”61 While the
Naturalization Act had been amended shortly after the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment to make persons of “African nativity” eligible for citizenship, its “free
white person” limitation remained in place and barred citizenship to large numbers
of potential or actual immigrants from many countries until being eliminated in
1952.62 In 1910, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit summarized the
meaning of the statutory term and illustrated the continuing power of overt racist
thinking in American law.
We think that the words [“free white persons”] refer to race and include
all persons of the white race, as distinguished from the [B]lack, red, yellow,
or brown races, which differ in so many respects from it. Whether there is
any pure white race and what peoples belong to it may involve nice
discriminations, but for practical purposes there is no difficulty in saying that

55.

Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 756.

56. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985, 985 (1956).
57.

Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22. Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943); e.g., Geary Act, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25
(1892) (extending Chinese Exclusion Act ten years and adding onerous new requirements) (repealed
1943).

58. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 731 (1893) (leaving the conditions upon which

aliens may remain in the United States to the political branches); Chang Chan v. Nagle, 268 U.S. 346,
352–53 (1925) (upholding a federal statute that denied admission to Chinese wives of American
citizens).

59.

See Erika Lee, At America’s Gates 151–52 (2003) (discussing immigration practices designed to
exclude Chinese immigrants); Lucy E. Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers 38 (1995) (tracing contemporary
immigration law back to anti-Chinese immigration policies).

60. Magnuson Act, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600 (1943) (repealed 1965).
61.

Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed and replaced 1795).

62. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 311, 66 Stat. 163, 239 (1952) (amended 1965); Gross,

supra note 11, at 6.
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the Chinese, Japanese, and Malays and the American Indians do not belong
to the white race.63

For its part, the Supreme Court approved and applied the Naturalization Act’s
race-based provision as well. In the 1920s, it addressed the act’s meaning twice and
unanimously upheld its racially-rooted and discriminatory purpose. In one case the
Court ruled that a light-skinned Japanese man did not qualify for citizenship;64 in
the other it ruled that a “high-caste Hindu, of full Indian blood,” equally failed the
“white person” requirement.65 The former was not a member of “what is popularly
known as the Caucasian race” and therefore not a “white person,”66 and the latter was
equally not “Caucasian” and therefore equally not “white.”67 The Court’s decisions
excluded both men from citizenship.68 Congress repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act
in 1943 and ended the Naturalization Act’s expressly race-based exclusions with
passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA). A quota system
limiting Chinese immigration, however, ended only in 1965, with passage of the
INA amendments.
IV.	RE-VISIONING RACE: LAW AS RESPONSIVE TO CHANGING ATTITUDES,
POLITICS, AND VALUES

As Congress’ 1952 repeal of the overtly racial restriction in the Naturalization
Act suggested, both popular and legal attitudes toward race began changing
substantially in the years after World War II. Black migration to northern cities
began to change the nation’s demographics and increase the political influence of
Black Americans; the horrific and unprecedented racial policies of Nazi Germany
and their catastrophic results repulsed Americans and discredited racist ideas; the
civil rights movement gathered strength and rallied public support; and Cold War
pressures made American racial laws a significant international embarrassment. In
that context the Supreme Court under new Chief Justice Earl Warren began a virtual
revolution in the constitutional law of race.69 In Brown v. Board of Education70 and
63. United States v. Balsara, 180 F. 694, 696 (2d Cir. 1910).
64. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 197–98 (1922).
65.

United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 206, 213–15 (1923).

66. Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 197–98.
67.

Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. at 213–15.

68. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (amended 1965). For an examination of the

role that ideas of race played in American immigration history, see John Tehranian, Performing Whiteness:
Naturalization Litigation and the Construction of Racial Identity in America, 109 Yale L.J. 817 (2000).

69. See generally Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice (1998);

Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights (2004); Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren
Court and American Politics (2000). Warren served as the chief justice from 1953 to 1969.
Horwitz, supra.

70. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate

but equal’ has no place.”).
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Bolling v. Sharpe,71 both decided unanimously in 1954, the Warren Court overturned
Plessy’s “separate but equal” doctrine,72 and over the next decade it pressed a concerted
judicial campaign to enforce a broad constitutional norm of racial equality under the
aegis of the Equal Protection Clause.73
After a series of decisions invalidating laws that imposed racial segregation and
discrimination in various public services and facilities, the Court finally addressed
the constitutionality of anti-miscegenation laws.74 In 1967 in Loving v. Virginia it
struck down Virginia’s notorious Racial Integrity Act and similar laws in fifteen
other states.75 Apparently embarrassed to acknowledge that it had refused to address
that same issue only a decade earlier,76 the Court in Loving was unwilling even to
refer to its earlier action. Instead, it declared that “[t]here can be no doubt that
restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the
central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.” 77
Neither Brown nor Loving—nor any other Warren Court decision—declared racial
classifications always and invariably unconstitutional. “[T]he Equal Protection Clause
requires the consideration of whether the classifications drawn by any statute constitute
an arbitrary and invidious discrimination,” Loving declared.78 It stressed that “[t]he
clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official
state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States,”79 and it insisted that the
Equal Protection Clause demanded that racial classifications “be subjected to the most
rigid scrutiny.”80 Such racial classifications “must be shown to be necessary to the
accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial
discrimination which [. . .] was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate.”81
The nation’s newly prevailing attitudes toward race inspired not just the Court
but Congress as well. After adopting two weak civil rights laws in 1957 and 1960,82
71.

347 U.S. 497, 498 & n.1 (1954) (“We have this day held that the Equal Protection Clause . . . prohibits the
states from maintaining racially segregated public schools.” (citing Brown, 483 U.S. at 494–95)).

72. 163 U.S. 537, 544, 550–52 (1896).
73. In 1963, for example, the Court banned racial discrimination in courthouses. Johnson v. Virginia, 373

U.S. 61, 62 (1963).

74.

See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).

75. Id. at 6 & n.5, 12.
76. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985, 985 (1956).
77.

Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.

78. Id. at 10.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 11 (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
81.

Id.

82. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended in scattered sections of

28 and 42 U.S.C.); Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).

152

VOLUME 66 | 2021/22

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

it enacted three far stronger and more effective measures during the 1960s.83 The
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a sweeping statute designed to prevent racial
discrimination—as well as discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, and
national origin—in governmental facilities, public accommodations, private
employment practices, and programs and activities receiving funds from the federal
government.84 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) prohibited the use of voter
qualifications that resulted in denying the vote to any person on the basis of race,
color, or language minority status, and it prohibited states and localities with histories
of voting discrimination from altering their voting laws without the approval of the
federal government.85 The Civil Rights Act of 1968 prohibited discrimination based
on race, color, religion, and national origin in the sale or rental of housing, and it
imposed restrictions on the practices of real estate agents and on advertising and
financing arrangements related to housing.86
The three statutes spurred a rush of lawsuits requiring the courts to construe
their meaning, and one of the most consequential came down in 1971. Title VII of
the 1964 act prohibited discrimination by private employers operating in interstate
commerce, and in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Court construed it to prohibit not
only “intentional” discrimination but also employment practices that were “neutral”
on their face yet in operation denied employment to Blacks far more frequently than
to whites.87 A “good intent or absence of discriminatory intent,” the Court announced,
“does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as
‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability.”88 Thus, absent a showing of necessity for proper job performance, all such
employment practices would violate the statute if they had a disparate racial impact.
“Congress,” the Court declared, “directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation.”89
By the early 1970s, then, the significance of race in American law had changed
drastically. The civil rights movement, Supreme Court decisions, congressional
actions, and changing social values severely disrupted some of the nation’s deeply
embedded racial status quo. In many areas, Blacks were enjoying new opportunities
and new areas of legal equality.
83. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of

42 and 52 U.S.C.); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.); Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18, 25, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).

84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a–e-2(a)(1).
85. 52 U.S.C. § 10301.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 3604. The elaborate Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 added discrimination

on the basis of gender to the 1968 act’s provisions. Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 5301).

87.

401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).

88. Id. at 432.
89. Id.
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V.	CONTESTING THE LEGAL VISIBILITY OF RACE: THE RISE OF “COLORBLIND”
CONSTITUTIONALISM

As law and popular attitudes about race changed, so too did general ideas about
the nature of the Constitution and the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.
Looking for inspiration from the past to support the nation’s newly proclaimed legal
commitment to racial equality, many Americans rediscovered and hailed the
resounding language of Justice John Marshall Harlan’s dissent in Plessy. There,
standing alone in rejecting the Court’s “separate but equal” doctrine, Harlan made a
bold declaration.
Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.
The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man,
and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights
as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.90

For many, Harlan’s declaration captured the ideal meaning of the Constitution.
Indeed, the idea of a “colorblind” Constitution had long antedated Harlan’s dissent.
It was, in fact, the basic principle that pre–Civil War abolitionists had advanced in
condemning slavery and seeking legal protections for Blacks.91 For a century and a
half the idea had failed to win the day, but after Brown and the major legal and
attitudinal changes that followed in the 1960s and 1970s the idea became newly
popular and widely admired.
No sooner had Harlan’s idea of a “colorblind” Constitution become prominent,
however, than it began to stir intensely felt legal and political controversies. With the
racial reorientation of American law and the rise of racial affirmative action efforts,
political activists, legal commentators, government officials, and Supreme Court
justices began splitting sharply over the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause and
the significance of Harlan’s “colorblind” language. Affirmative action plans raised
the question of whether it was proper for governments and private institutions to use
racial classifications in non-invidious ways to remedy the continuing impact of the
many burdens and disadvantages the nation had piled onto African Americans. The
issue first reached the Supreme Court in DeFunis v. Odegaard92 in 1974 and then
again four years later in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.93 In neither
case did the Court settle the constitutionality of affirmative action plans, but together
the two brought the sharply contested issue to the forefront of national debate.
As the controversy roiled American politics, those who supported affirmative
action plans argued that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited only the kinds of
90. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
91.

See generally Kull, supra note 18, at 131–81.

92.

416 U.S. 312, 316–20 (1974) (finding the case moot to avoid challenge to a law school’s affirmative
action plan).

93.

438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (plurality opinion) (invalidating an affirmative action plan on statutory and
constitutional grounds, with five justices nonetheless confirming that such plans may be upheld in
certain circumstances).
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“invidious” and repressive racial classifications that Warren Court decisions like
Brown and Loving had struck down. In contrast, those who opposed affirmative
action, and those who opposed the civil rights movement more generally, argued that
the Constitution should be “colorblind” and that—except for possible short-term
emergency measures—it should prohibit any and all laws that contained racial
classifications regardless of their “non-invidious” nature and supposedly benign and
remedial goals.94
Thus, in the context of affirmative action, the question was whether the
Constitution could properly “see” race and allow laws that made race a relevant factor
not just in banning “invidious” discrimination but also in remedying racial inequalities
and the continuing effects of past racial discrimination and oppression. That question
continues to challenge the law and public policy, and it is still hotly debated and not
wholly settled. Since the 1980s, the Court’s opinions have been increasingly critical
of race-based affirmative action efforts and have sharply limited the scope of their
allowable operation.95
Aside from the specific issue of affirmative action, however, the idea of
“colorblind” law raised another different and broader issue. To what extent is
“colorblind” law—that is, law that contains no racial classifications and gives no
formal indication that it implicates race—truly “neutral” in racial terms? To what
extent, in other words, does “colorblind” law fail to see racially biased elements that
are either embedded in the law’s forms and practices or enable racially disparate and
unequal results to flow regularly from the law’s de facto operations? Though the law
may be “colorblind” and race consequently invisible to it, do racial factors nonetheless
continue to bias the law in its forms, operations, and consequences?
When read in its entirety, Harlan’s Plessy dissent suggests disturbing and
potentially devastating answers to those questions. In spite of its invocation of the
noble-sounding ideal of a “colorblind” Constitution, Harlan’s dissenting opinion
rested on what he considered a deep social and legal truth. Immediately preceding his
famous “colorblind” statement came these three sentences:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And
so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So,
I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great
heritage, and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.96

94. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Making Sense of the Affirmative Action Debate, 22 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 1159,

1171 (1996).

95. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2209–10 (2016) (applying strict scrutiny to

affirmative action plans in education); Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 314
(2014) (declining to undo Michigan law allowing voters to decide whether racial preferences in education
are desired); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 274–76 (2003) (invalidating university admissions policy
that gave preference to “underrepresented minority applicant[s]”); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515
U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (restricting federal, state, and local affirmative action plans); City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (extending application of strict scrutiny to state and local
affirmative action plans).

96. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Harlan’s belief, in other words, was that the Constitution could be entirely
“colorblind” and still underwrite and sustain white racial supremacy. His opinion was
not only overtly racist but also deeply insightful: “Colorblind” law, he understood,
could focus on legal forms while ignoring social realities and practical consequence.
Thus, “colorblind” law could also be “socially blind” law, and it could ensure that the
“white race” remained “dominant” in virtually everything of social and economic
significance. “Every true man,” Harlan also wrote in Plessy, “has pride of race.”97
After the successes of the civil rights movement in the 1960s, it became clear that
those who opposed the movement and fought against the advances it brought—and
especially against affirmative action proposals—would need a new political rhetoric
and new legal strategies.98 Beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the
administration of President Richard M. Nixon began to develop both. The president’s
top two political advisors, H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, acknowledged
the nature of their new rhetoric and tactics, an approach that came to be called the
“Southern Strategy.” Nixon believed that “the whole problem is really the Blacks,”
Haldeman reported,99 and Ehrlichman identified their strategy’s resulting target:
“We’ll go after the racists.”100 They recognized, however, that it was essential to keep
their rhetoric and tactics indirect and cloaked. “The key,” Haldeman explained, was
“to devise a system that recognizes this [racial appeal] while not appearing to.”101
Thus, they designed their strategy to make a “subliminal appeal to the anti-Black
voter,” Ehrlichman confirmed, one that masked the driving racist appeal that “was
always present in Nixon’s statements and speeches.”102
Lee Atwater, another Republican strategist who later became President George H.
W. Bush’s top advisor, explained the party’s “Southern Strategy” in the bluntest terms:
You start out in 1954 by saying, “Nigger, nigger, nigger.” By 1968 you can’t
say “nigger”—that hurts you, backfires. So you say stuff like, uh, forced busing,
states’ rights, and all that stuff, and you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re
talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally
economic things and a byproduct of them is, [B]lacks get hurt worse than
whites . . . . “We want to cut this,” is much more abstract than even the busing
thing, uh, and a hell of a lot more abstract than “Nigger, nigger.”103

97.

Id. at 554.

98. See generally Kevin J. McMahon, Nixon’s Court 4–7 (2011) (describing President Nixon’s rhetorical

strategy against judicial liberalism); David Alistair Yalof, Pursuit of Justices 97–99 (1999)
(outlining the politics of Supreme Court nominations).

99. H. R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries 77 (1994).
100. John Ehrlichman, Witness to Power 222 (1982).
101. Haldeman, supra note 99.
102. Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow 43–44 (2010). “Richard Nixon [was] watching one of his

campaign ads warning voters about urban crime and exclaimed, ‘[t]his hits it right on the nose. It’s all about
law and order and the damn Negro-Puerto Rican groups out there.’” Paul Butler, Chokehold 13 (2017).

103. Rick Perlstein, Exclusive: Lee Atwater’s Infamous 1981 Interview on the Southern Strategy, Nation (Nov. 13,

2012), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/exclusive-lee-atwaters-infamous-1981-interviewsouthern-strategy/.
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The idea of “colorblind” law—an image that on its face suggests the noble principles
of legal equality and “blind” justice—provided a ready abstraction that could and did
serve that racist strategy.
The fundamental question, then, is when, in what contexts, and in what specific
ways, does the “colorblind” idea serve that animating “Southern Strategy” and
achieve the unequal racial consequences the strategy was designed to ensure? When,
in other words, does the rhetoric and practice of “colorblind” law serve noble ideals
and honor egalitarian principles, and when does it serve ignoble purposes and
facilitate racist results?
By the third decade of the twenty-first century, three conclusions about race and
American law seem beyond dispute. The first is a matter of history. For three
centuries, from the early seventeenth century to the middle of the twentieth,
American law remained race-based and repressive, effectively enforcing whites as the
“dominant” race. Beyond occasions calling for celebratory rhetoric, it had no
particular use for the “colorblind” idea. In the 1950s and 1960s, however, the Warren
Court transformed racial classifications from instruments used to repress Blacks into
instruments used to protect them. Accordingly, the idea of “colorblind” law took on
a radically different political and legal salience. While the idea negated the power of
whites to use the law openly for explicit racist purposes, it nonetheless offered an
effective legal tool to counterattack the civil rights movement and preserve large
areas of de facto white supremacy. The mandate that the law must be “colorblind”
severely limited the ability of government to remedy the unequal racial consequences
that f lowed from the overwhelming social, economic, cultural, and political
advantages that whites had amassed over those preceding three race-repressive
centuries. In the 1970s, then, the legal instrument of abolitionists and those in earlier
generations who had sought to protect Blacks became the legal instrument of those
in later generations who sought to protect whites.
The second conclusion is a matter of law. By the early twenty-first century, courts
subjected racial classifications of all types to “strict scrutiny” and approved them only
in the narrowest possible circumstances.104 The courts, in other words, came to
enforce the general principle that law should be “colorblind.”
The third conclusion is a matter of fact. Racial bias, inequality, and discrimination
remain common in American life. Comparing “whites” and “Blacks” by wealth,
income levels, access to credit, educational status, police stops and arrests,
incarceration rates, availability of quality health care, desirable residential locations,
and leadership positions in private and public institutions reveals essentially the same
result on each measure: Across the spectrum of social and economic standing, whites
occupy a far more favorable and advantaged position than Blacks.105
104. E.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (“[A]ll racial classifications reviewable under the

Equal Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized.” (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515
U.S. 200, 224 (1995))).

105. For a general discussion of this point, see Frank W. Munger & Carroll Seron, Law and the Persistence of

Racial Inequality in America, 66 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 175, 178–79 (2021–2022), and Penelope Andrews,
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Apparently, Harlan was right about the formal nature and practical racial
significance of “colorblind” law. As one Black writer put it in 2019, “an infantile
colorblindness” enables people “to escape the task of having to contemplate the
possibility and pervasiveness of real injustice.”106
VI. T
 HE NEW LEGAL INVISIBILITY OF RACE: “COLORBLIND” LAW AND ITS SUPPLE
TECHNIQUES

The intriguing question is how “colorblind” law accomplishes unequal racial
results. The answer lies in a variety of techniques that lack racial significance on
their face but that nonetheless protect built-in “white privilege,”107 allow or enable
racial discrimination, and welcome differential racial consequences. Those techniques
include, among others, abstract doctrines that ignore social realities, formal rules
that mask and entrench social inequalities, facially neutral categories that are racially
skewed in practice, jurisprudential principles that define race as normatively
irrelevant, and delegations of discretion to government officials, especially those
operating at lower levels of authority where they are difficult or impossible to
searchingly review.
A. Constitutional Jurisprudence

The Supreme Court has utilized or approved several of those techniques. First, it
still enforces constitutional rules that it established as part of the racially driven postReconstruction settlement that began in the 1870s and triumphed in the 1890s. As a
practical matter—and almost certainly as the late nineteenth-century Court
originally and clearly intended108—those rules severely limit possibilities for obtaining
legal relief from racial disparities and inequalities. In particular, the Court has
retained restrictive post-Reconstruction era interpretations of both the Eleventh109
and Fourteenth Amendments.110 Its continued embrace of a severely limiting
A Commission on Recognition and Reconstruction for the United States: Illusory or Inspirational?, 66 N.Y.L.
Sch. L. Rev. 359, 364 (2021–2022).
106. Thomas Chatterton Williams, Self-Portrait in Black and White 134 (2019).
107. The concept of “white privilege,” as I use it here, does not mean that white people enjoy special

substantive privileges in general or that many or most whites have comfortable and easy lives. It means
only that whites are not burdened by the racial biases and discrimination that may oppress Blacks and
make Black lives in many ways more difficult than the lives of whites.

108. The Supreme Court in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was packed with overtly racist

justices. See generally Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An
Essay on Law, Race, History, and Federal Courts, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1927, 2001–38 (2003).

109. For examples of the Court retaining a restrictive post-Reconstruction era interpretation of the Eleventh

Amendment, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1974); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 54 (1996); and Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100–01 (1984).

110. For examples of the Court retaining a restrictive post-Reconstruction era interpretation of the Fourteenth

Amendment, see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 8–18 (1948); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715, 721–22 (1961); and DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189,
195–202 (1989).
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interpretation of the former, rooted in a decision made in 1890, blocks suits for
damages against states for racial discrimination, and its continued embrace of a
decision made in 1883 severely limits the authority of both Congress and the Court
to reach racial discriminations that are not the result of “state action.”111 That state
action doctrine makes “private” discrimination constitutionally unreachable under
the Fourteenth Amendment and hence legally invisible to it, and it thereby protects
much of the racial status quo and the highly advantaged position that whites have
long enjoyed.112
Second, when opponents began to challenge affirmative action plans in the
1970s—and after Nixon had reshaped the Court by putting four new justices on the
High Bench113 —the Court subtly shifted its analysis under the Equal Protection
Clause. Instead of invalidating laws and governmental actions that involved
“invidious” discriminations against racial and other “suspect classes,”114 it began to
subject all laws that used any racial classification to “strict scrutiny” and invalidate
them regardless of their “non-invidious” nature and racially benevolent and remedial
purposes.115 The shift reoriented equal protection law away from examining invidious
discriminatory actions against particularly vulnerable groups to applying a socially
abstract and near-absolute principle that prohibited the use of racial classifications
for any purpose, however benign, socially beneficial, and compensatory in design.
The practical result of that doctrinal shift was to undo or bar many or most positive

111. The two decisions that helped establish the post-Reconstruction Constitution and that remain in force

today are Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17 (1890), involving the Eleventh Amendment, and the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17–19 (1883), involving the Fourteenth Amendment.

112. While the Fourteenth Amendment itself reaches only state action, it does confer on Congress the power

to enforce its provisions, and under that power (and similar powers granted in the Thirteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments) Congress can reach some kinds of “private” discrimination. U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 5. During the past quarter century or so, however, the Court has revisited the “colorblind”
principle and has also significantly restricted those congressional powers. Compare South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327–28 (1966) (Warren Court), and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
652–53 (1966) (Warren Court), with Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78–79 (2000) (Rehnquist
Court), and Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (Rehnquist Court), and
Coleman v. Ct. of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 37–38 (2012) (Roberts Court).

113. McMahon, supra note 98, at 6.
114. The idea of “suspect classes” referred to groups who suffered from discrimination and whose status as

“discrete and insular minorities” prevented them from fully participating and protecting themselves in
the normal political process. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also,
e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (race-based distinction is suspect); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191–92 (1964) (same); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (same);
McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of Chi., 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (same). But see Mass. Bd. of
Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (age-based distinction not suspect).

115. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (subjecting

race-based classification to strict scrutiny even though it was designed to benefit racial minorities);
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (same); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200,
224 (1995) (same); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989) (same).
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government efforts to assist Blacks in overcoming the de facto social inequalities and
discrimination they faced.116
The shift transformed the Equal Protection Clause from a vibrant safeguard for
the vulnerable and disadvantaged into a muscular protection for the nation’s whites
and the government-assisted head start they had long enjoyed in reaching their
position of social and economic advantage. Indeed, the Court began to consider any
collateral disadvantage that whites might suffer from affirmative action programs as
constitutional injuries sufficient to invalidate programs designed to assist Blacks.117
Third, at virtually the same time that it implemented its strict scrutiny analysis,
the new Nixon-appointed Court also read into the Equal Protection Clause a highly
restrictive requirement of “intent.”118 In doing so, it refused to adopt the “disparate
impact” standard it had previously approved for Title VII claims in Griggs. It refused
as well to stay with its general rule that legislative “intent” was too difficult to identify
and that bad legislative motives should therefore be irrelevant in assessing whether
government actions violated equal protection.119 Instead, in 1976 it held that those
asserting violations of the clause had to show that they were victims of “intentional”
acts of racial discrimination.120 The decision meant that, except in extreme situations,
evidence showing patterns and practices of de facto racial discrimination would fail
to establish equal protection claims.121 The Court has “not held that a law, neutral on
116. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (proscribing a race-conscious medical

school admissions program).

117. The need to protect “innocent” white victims was given voice in Bakke and developed in later cases. Id.

at 298, 307; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 514 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (weighing “the
effect of the [race-conscious remedy] upon innocent third parties” in his affirmative action analysis);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (emphasizing the effect of race-conscious
remedies on “innocent people”); see also David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and
Innocent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices?, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 790, 794–95 (1991)
(citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276).

118. The “intent” standard rejected the previous and more effective interpretation of the Equal Protection

Clause that allowed courts to void a measure when, in effect, it “operates as a discrimination against”
Blacks. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 401–02 (1964).

119. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224–25 (1971).

First, it is extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation, or collection of
different motivations, that lie behind a legislative enactment. . . . Furthermore, there is
an element of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives
of its supporters. If the law is struck down for this reason, rather than because of its
facial content or effect, it would presumably be valid as soon as the legislature or
relevant governing body repassed it for different reasons.

Id. (citation omitted) “[I]t simply is ‘not consonant with our scheme of government for a court to inquire
into the motives of legislators.’” Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 55 (1998) (quoting Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951)).
120. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–41 (1976). On the Court’s shift toward restricting the reach of

the Equal Protection Clause and anti-discrimination laws, see, for example, Reva B. Siegel, Equality
Divided, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 16 (2013).

121. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (“[I]mpact alone is

not determinative.”). The Court has held that a discriminatory purpose can be found only by a showing

160

VOLUME 66 | 2021/22

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue,” it
declared in Washington v. Davis, “is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply
because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.”122 The Court’s
new “intent” requirement opened extensive opportunities for individuals and
organizations to maintain discriminatory practices, or even to develop new ones, as
long as their tactics remained discreet and cleverly indirect.
The Court understood what it was doing and the practical significance of
“colorblind” law. One of the reasons it offered for adopting its exacting “intent”
standard was that a looser “disparate impact” standard might render a wide range of
established legal provisions vulnerable to claims of racial discrimination.123 In
admitting that concern, the Court revealed that it understood that discriminatory
racial practices were common and that, for the most part, it had no interest in trying
to remedy them. Its “intent” standard would serve to block legal challenges to such
practices in a wide variety of legal areas.
In the 1987 case of McCleskey v. Kemp, for example, considering the
constitutionality of the death penalty in Georgia,124 the Court confronted an
extensive evidentiary record that included massive statistical studies demonstrating
the existence of severe racial disparities between Blacks and whites—all to the
literally fatal disadvantage of Blacks.125 The Court responded by simply declaring
that the evidence was insufficient to prove an “intent” to discriminate.126 Indeed, one
of the justices in the majority considered the record evidence essentially irrelevant.127
that a decision maker acted “at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon
an identifiable group.” Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). That requirement of a
specific discriminatory intent limited even more severely the ability of plaintiffs to support equal
protection claims with evidence of discriminatory impact. See Reva B. Siegel, Blind Justice: Why the
Court Refused to Accept Statistical Evidence of Discriminatory Purpose in McCleskey v. Kemp—and Some
Pathways for Change, 112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1269, 1279 (2018).
122. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
123. Id. at 247–48.

A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent
compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another
would be far-reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a
whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be
more burdensome to the poor and to the average [B]lack than to the more affluent white.

Id. at 248.

124. 481 U.S. 279, 283 (1987).
125. Id. at 286–88.

[T]he death penalty was assessed in 22[ percent] of the cases involving [B]lack
defendants and white victims; 8[ percent] of the cases involving white defendants and
white victims; 1[ percent] of the cases involving [B]lack defendants and [B]lack victims;
and 3[ percent] of the cases involving white defendants and [B]lack victims.

Id. at 286.
126. Id. at 297.
127. Id. at 313.
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“Since it is my view that the unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and
antipathies, including racial, . . . is real, . . . and ineradicable,” Justice Antonin Scalia
wrote, “I cannot honestly say that all I need is more proof.”128 The Court’s decision,
one commentator concluded, “was driven by a desire to immunize the entire criminal
justice system from claims of racial bias.”129
The fourth technique employed by the Court was the doctrine of “standing” to
substantially narrow access to the federal courts in civil rights cases designed to
prevent governmental practices that were especially harmful to Blacks.130 As the
post-Reconstruction Court had found ways to ignore race in such notoriously racist
cases as 1898’s Williams v. Mississippi131 and 1903’s Giles v. Harris,132 so did the
modern Court similarly refuse to “see” apparent racial discrimination in such late
twentieth-century cases as O’Shea v. Littleton,133 in 1974, and City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, in 1983.134 In those cases the Court ruled that the requirement of standing
meant that persons injured by certain governmental practices could not seek to enjoin
those practices unless they could show that they themselves were likely to suffer from
the same practices again in the future.135 Declaring that the parties in neither case
could show the likelihood of such future specific and individual encounters, the
Court made it virtually impossible for anyone to obtain injunctive relief against
systematic or patterned racial abuses in many governmental administrative processes
and in the police use of potentially deadly force against Blacks, regardless of the
substantial differential racial impact of these abuses.
In Lyons, for example, the Court’s majority altogether refused even to mention race
or even to acknowledge record evidence of widespread police violence against Blacks.
Not only did it fail to respond to the dissent’s emphasis on that race-related evidence,
but it also totally ignored the fact that the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) had
a long and well-documented reputation for racial abuse, violence, and discrimination.136
128. Richard L. Hasen, The Justice of Contradictions 156–57 (2018) (quoting Justice Scalia in a

private memo to his colleagues pending the McCleskey ruling, dated January 6, 1987).

129. Alexander, supra note 102, at 108; see also Lynn Su, Unpacking the Teaching Potential of a Hypothetical

Criminal Case Involving a Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identification, 66 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 339 (2021–
2022).

130. For the Court’s development of procedural tools that similarly disadvantage Blacks, see, for example,

Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Exploring the Interpretation and Application of Procedural Rules: The Problem of
Implicit and Institutional Racial Bias, 169 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2583, 2594–99 (2021).

131. 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
132. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
133. 414 U.S. 488 (1974). For a similar case, see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
134. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
135. O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 498; Lyons, 461 U.S. at 109.
136. See, e.g., Gerald Horne, Fire This Time 134–37, 150–52 (1995) (“[Even Black officers] felt obliged

to heighten brutality against Black LA.”); Kelly Lytle Hernández, City of Inmates 189 (2017);
Max Felker-Kantor, Policing Los Angeles 25–26 (2018); Anne Gray Fischer, “Land of the White
Hunter”: Legal Liberalism and the Racial Politics of Morals Enforcement in Midcentury Los Angeles, 105 J.
Am. Hist. 868, 871 (2019).
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“The LAPD was rife with both conscious and common sense racism,” explained one
commentator, and “[i]n communities like East Los Angeles, racial prejudice produced
more than increased arrests; it also fueled high levels of police violence.”137 To the
majority in Lyons, however, the fact of “race” was quite literally invisible.138
A fifth judicial technique admits “seeing” racial discrimination but trumps that
fact with some purportedly countervailing constitutional principle. In 2013, Shelby
County v. Holder exemplified that technique when it invalidated a pivotal provision
of the VRA, a statute that had helped secure Black voting rights across the entire
South.139 There, the Court acknowledged that “voting discrimination still exists,”
and even declared that “no one doubts that.”140 Nonetheless, it held that it was more
important to enforce another—and quite novel—constitutional principle than it was
to protect Black voting rights from new restrictions that were likely to be imposed by
state and local governments.141 The fact that the statute treated states with histories
of voting discrimination differently from states lacking such histories meant that the
statute violated a principle of state equality. On that ground, the Court invalidated a
pivotal provision of the act142 and thereby opened the door to efforts in many states to
adopt election procedures designed to disproportionally restrict the ability of
minorities to vote.143
Similarly, in Trump v. Hawaii in 2018 the Court used principles of executive
power to justify racially-tinged religious discrimination against individuals
attempting to enter the United States from certain Islamic countries.144 Principles
and precedents involving race, the majority declared, were “wholly inapt” in judging
137. Ian F. Haney López, Racism on Trial 137, 141 (2003).
138. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 97–98. To the dissent, race was quite visible, and it pointed out the differential and

potentially deadly racial impact of the police practice at issue. See id. at 114–25 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

139. 52 U.S.C. § 10303, invalidated by Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
140. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 536.
141. See id. at 544 (enforcing the principle of equal sovereignty). In the decision’s wake, Republican state

legislators introduced hundreds of bills designed to restrict voting rights, and they have passed a number of
them in several states, including in those freed from federal oversight by the decision in Shelby County. See
Voting Laws Roundup: March 2021, Brennan Ctr. for Just. (Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.
org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-march-2021.

142. See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 556–57 (finding that section 4(b) of the VRA, which outlined the federal

preclearance formula for state voting laws, infringed upon “equal sovereignty” of the states and was
therefore unconstitutional).

143. Lisa Marshall Manheim & Elizabeth G. Porter, The Elephant in the Room: Intentional Voter Suppression,

2018 Sup. Ct. Rev. 213, 218–19; Ian Vandewalker & Keith G. Bentele, Vulnerability in Numbers: Racial
Composition of the Electorate, Voter Suppression, and the Voting Rights Act, 18 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 99,
145–46 (2015); Theodore R. Johnson & Max Feldman, The New Voter Suppression, Brennan Ctr. for
Just. ( Jan. 16, 2020), https://w w w.brennancenter.org/our-work /research-reports/new-votersuppression; Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reflections on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the March and the Speech:
History, Memory, Values, 59 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 17, 51–55 (2014–2015).

144. 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2405 (2018) (upholding entry restrictions on certain nationals from Chad, Iran, Libya,

North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen).
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the power of the executive to enforce “a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign
nationals the privilege of admission.”145
B. Conceptual and Administrative Techniques

Beyond the realm of Supreme Court doctrine, the legal system as a whole has
also used or accepted other techniques to allow or impose racial discrimination while
keeping race itself formally invisible. One is to use surrogate legal categories that are
“non-racial” on their face but that, in fact, enable governmental units to achieve
disproportionate racial impacts.
Under Southern pressure, for example, many of the basic social programs that the
New Deal established included provisions that effectively excluded large numbers of
Blacks from the social and economic benefits the programs conferred.146 The Social
Security Act initially excluded farmworkers and domestics from its coverage, thus
successfully denying benefits to 65 percent of Blacks nationally and between 70 and
80 percent of Blacks in the South.147 In the twenty-first century such obvious tactics
may no longer pass muster, but other similar and more subtle tactics remain in use:
Today, government rarely classifies by race or gender, but it conducts a “war
on drugs,” regulates education and residential zoning, responds to “sexual
assault” and “domestic violence,” and makes policy concerning “child care,”
“family leave,” “child support,” and the “welfare” of “single-headed households”
in ways that often perpetuate, or aggravate, historic patterns of race and gender
inequality.148

Beneath formal legal categories, in other words, the operations of legal administration
in a wide range of areas often support disparate racial practices and bring disparate
racial consequences.149
Similarly, using a different “neutral” category, the federal government was able to
continuously funnel lavish sums of money to predominantly white beneficiaries.150
145. Id. at 2423. For a discussion of race in the immigration context, see Lenni B. Benson, Seeing Immigration

and Structural Racism: It’s Where You Put Your Eyes, 66 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 277 (2021–2022).

146. See Jim Powell, Why Did FDR’s New Deal Harm Blacks?, Cato Inst. (Dec. 3, 2003), https://www.cato.

org/commentary/why-did-fdrs-new-deal-harm-blacks#.

147. See Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White 45 (2005). The exclusion was not

eliminated until 1954. Id. at 43. “In short, each of the old age, social assistance, and unemployment
provisions advanced by the Social Security Act was shaped to racist contours.” Id. at 48.

148. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State

Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1111, 1145–46 (1997).

149. See, e.g., Hannah Dreier & Andrew Ba Tran, ‘The Real Damage,’ Wash. Post (July 11, 2021), https://

www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/07/11/fema-black-owned-property/ (discussing the disparate
racial consequences of FEMA’s policy to deny disaster relief to Americans who fail to provide proof of
property ownership); Richard Chused, Strategic Thinking About Racism in American Zoning, 66 N.Y.L.
Sch. L. Rev. 307, 310–25 (2021–2022).

150. See Emma Fernandez et al., Fall 2018 Journal: Mortgage Interest Deduction and the Racial Wealth Gap,

Berkeley Pub. Pol’y J. (Aug. 23, 2018), https://bppj.berkeley.edu/2018/08/23/mortgage-interestdeduction-and-the-racial-wealth-gap/.
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Privileging the category of “homeowner,” it provided tax deductions for home
mortgage payments, a seemingly reasonable policy that had enormous—and racially,
highly differential—consequences. For nearly a hundred years, “one of the largest
federal welfare transfers in the nation remains the home mortgage deduction, an
enormous subsidy to middle-class homeowners, the vast majority of whom are
suburban and white.”151 At the same time, other ostensibly “neutral” tax policies had
comparably disparate racial impacts. “Even half a century after government ceased to
promote [residential] segregation explicitly,” concluded one scholar, its tax policy
“continues to promote it implicitly” through a variety of technical devices.152
Another such legal tactic is shifting administrative control over social programs to
states and localities and providing those lower-level governmental units with statutory
discretion that allows them to discriminate covertly against Blacks in applying the
law.153 For example, the G.I. Bill enacted after World War II used that technique and
it brought the expected results.154 Providing financial support to millions of veterans
and spurring the growth of a newly prosperous and expanding middle class, the law
authorized local administrative discretion and controls that allowed many states and
localities to exclude large numbers of Blacks from its coverage.155
In numerous ways, often technical and indirect, other government policies had
the same disparate racial consequences.156 “Racial politics shaped the welfare state in
important ways,” one analyst concluded.157 The practical operation of many social
programs “helped to redraw lines of division within and between races by sorting
both [B]lack and white Americans into categories defined by their relationship to
programs of social provision.” 158 The “[B]lack ghetto was constructed by
institutionalized discrimination in the real estate and banking industries, supported
by widespread acts of private prejudice and discrimination,” concluded two others.159
“Rather than combating these forces of segregation, however, during most of the

151. Robert O. Self, American Babylon 329 (2003).
152. Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law 180 (2017).
153. Katznelson, supra note 147, at 22, 37–38, 44–47.
154. See Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, 38 U.S.C. § 1801 (repealed 2000).
155. Id.; Katznelson, supra note 147, at 113–41; see also Michael K. Brown, Race, Money, and the

American Welfare State 372 (1999) [hereinafter Race, Money, American Welfare] (“Nonexclusive,
race-neutral policies in America have a way of being particularized along racial lines.”); Richard D.
Marsico, The Intersection of Race, Wealth, and Special Education: The Role of Structural Inequities in the IDEA,
66 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 207 (2021–2022).

156. For a recent episode of discrimination in the federal government, see Valerie Grim, Between Forty Acres

and a Class Action Lawsuit: Black Farmers, Civil Rights, and Protest Against the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
1997–2010, in Beyond Forty Acres and a Mule (Debra A. Reid & Evan P. Bennett eds., 2012).

157. Robert C. Lieberman, Shifting the Color Line (1998).
158. Id.
159. Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid 186 (1993).
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postwar era federal policies actually abetted them.”160 By using ostensibly “neutral”
categories and allowing administrative discretion to local officials, the law became a
social “instrument for widening an already huge racial gap in postwar America.”161
To understand the pervasive nature of present-day racial inequality, it is essential
to recognize that the disparate racial consequences that those techniques caused have
continued to operate long after their most egregious variations were restricted or
abolished. Those earlier discriminatory legal policies combined to give whites
substantial head starts in enjoying well-paid union jobs, obtaining college educations,
advancing to higher paying white-collar positions, securing mortgages to buy their
own homes, entering prestigious and influential professions, ensuring their families
better and more readily available health care, moving to highly desirable
neighborhoods, guaranteeing advantageous educational opportunities for their
children, and amassing financial resources that allowed them to invest in and profit
from the nation’s booming economic growth. Those benefits, in turn, allowed large
numbers of white families to amass over time comparatively larger amounts of
inheritable wealth and to use that wealth to pass on their accumulated social
advantages to their descendants.162 By ruling race a forbidden classification, the
“colorblind” Constitution of the late twentieth century served to preserve those
historically built-in advantages that the law had methodically conferred on whites.163
Similarly, allowing local discretion—particularly after Shelby County invalidated
a pivotal provision of the VRA164 —has enabled many states and counties to
discriminate against Blacks and other minorities by restricting their right to vote.
Ostensibly honoring the formal law while warning against oft-imagined voter
“fraud,” those state and local government units have developed a variety of techniques
that appear neutral on their face but in practice impose special burdens on Blacks,
the elderly, and other relatively disadvantaged groups.165 Voter ID laws, restrictions
on early voting, redistricting, gerrymandering, purging voter rolls, relocating polling
places, reducing the number of polling places, providing misleading information
about times and places of voting, and other similar administrative techniques all
serve that overriding purpose.166 Three years after Shelby County, for example, the
presidential election of 2016 featured 868 fewer polling places in “heavily Black and
160. Id.; see also Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, Race for Profit 122 (2019) (discussing HUD policies

“likely to deepen the existing segregation in the community”).

161. Katznelson, supra note 147, at 121.
162. See Rothstein, supra note 152, at 210–30; Mehrsa Baradaran, The Color of Money 95–96, 101,

211 (2017); Thomas M. Shapiro, The Hidden Cost of Being African American 42–60 (2004);
Lieberman, supra note 157, at 12.

163. See Jill Quadagno, The Color of Welfare 17–31 (1994); E. D. Hirsch, Jr., The Making of

Americans 123–51 (2009); Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis 150–53 (rev. ed.
2005).

164. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 540, 556–57 (2013) (invalidating section 4(b)).
165. See Michael Tomasky, Fighting to Vote, N.Y. Rev., Nov. 8, 2018, at 8, 8–9.
166. Johnson & Feldman, supra note 143; see also Jesse H. Rhodes, Ballot Blocked 181–82 (2017).
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Latino counties” than there had been in 2012.167 Such purportedly neutral and often
virtually invisible administrative practices disproportionally limited minority voting,
distorted election outcomes, and helped preserve a white-advantaged social and
political order.168
Allowing local discretion has been equally or more effective in producing racially
discriminatory results in the criminal justice system.169 Regardless of the “colorblind”
nature of the formal law and the existence of racially neutral constitutional rights,
discretion in the hands of police and prosecutors invites and even encourages racial
abuses that commonly go unrecorded and unremedied.170 The LAPD, for example,
engaged for decades in racially discriminatory practices against Blacks, especially Black
women.171 Even after the Warren Court’s innovative criminal law rulings in the early
1960s, LAPD “officers retained broad discretionary power in [B]lack neighborhoods
to conduct vice raids, crackdowns, and mass arrests for morals offenses,” identifying
“sexual deviance with [B]lackness.”172
Similarly, for reasons of conscious or unconscious bias, both police and prosecutors
have often downplayed or essentially ignored claims that Blacks have been subject to
racially motivated violence.173 They have used their discretion to dismiss offensive and
violent actions by whites as mere “pranks” or relatively minor incidents not worthy of
serious legal attention. The “extraordinary discretion” that law enforcement officials
exercised, a criminal law scholar recently concluded, allowed “a formally colorblind
criminal justice system” to regularly achieve “racially discriminatory results.”174

167. Tomasky, supra note 165, at 2.
168. See Rhodes, supra note 166, at 97, 187.
169. In 2020, the Supreme Court finally invalidated one such abuse of local discretion. Louisiana and

Oregon had both enacted statutes that authorized the use of non-unanimous jury verdicts in criminal
cases, a practice that allowed white majorities on juries to negate the votes of minority jury members.
Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1394 (2020). As Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote for the Court with
respect to Louisiana’s law, the state had “sculpted a ‘facially race-neutral’ rule permitting 10-to-2
verdicts in order ‘to ensure that African-American juror service would be meaningless.’” Id. (quoting
State v. Maxie, No. 13-CR-72522 (La. 11th Jud. Dist. Oct. 11, 2018)).

170. The Court has enhanced police discretion substantially. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)

(stop and frisk); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996) (pretextual stops); see also Sarah
A. Seo, Policing the Open Road 247 (2019) (on pretextual policing); Gretchen Sorin, Driving
While Black 119–49 (2020) (citing cars as critical to the civil rights movement).

171. See Felker-Kantor, supra note 136, at 113–38; Hernández, supra note 136, at 170–71, 177; Horne,

supra note 136, at 136, 143; Fischer, supra note 136, at 880.

172. Fischer, supra note 136, at 871.
173. Tanya Katerí Hernández, Note, Bias Crimes: Unconscious Racism in the Prosecution of “Racially Motivated

Violence,” 99 Yale L.J. 845, 851–55 (1990).

174. Alexander, supra note 102, at 100; Su, supra note 129.
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C. Prescriptive Principles and Normative Theories

In support of those various conceptual and administrative techniques, the law
has also employed a variety of principles and theories to justify its refusal to “see”
racial disparities and inequalities. Revealingly, many of those techniques trace back
to the earliest opposition to postwar Reconstruction when Americans first faced the
question of how to treat the newly “freed” slaves. President Andrew Johnson led the
way in both spearheading and justifying opposition to legal efforts to remedy the
consequences of racism and race-based slavery. A vigorous defender of the South,
Johnson supported the region’s efforts to scuttle Reconstruction and reassert control
over its freed Black population.175 Immediately, Johnson understood that certain
ideas could be deployed to make race normatively and therefore legally invisible and,
consequently, to undermine and defeat government efforts to aid the freed slaves. In
February 1866, when the smoke of the Civil War had barely cleared, Johnson vetoed
the Freedmen’s Bureau bill, a Republican measure designed to provide substantial
social, familial, housing, and economic benefits to tens of thousands of freed slaves.176
Johnson insisted that such a government effort would be unnecessary, immoral, and
harmful to its intended beneficiaries.
First, government efforts to aid the freed slaves would be unnecessary because
the free market would solve their problems. “Competition for his services from
planters” would enable the former slave “to command almost his own terms” of
employment.177 The “laws that regulate supply and demand will maintain their
force,” he declared, “and the wages of the laborer will be regulated thereby.”178
Second, Johnson maintained that such government aid would be essentially immoral.
To require the freed slaves to succeed “by their own efforts” and to “establish for
themselves a condition of respectability and prosperity” was “no more than justice to
them.”179 “It [was] certain that they can attain to that condition only through their
own merits and exertions.” 180 Third, government aid would be harmful and
demeaning to the freed slaves themselves. “The idea on which the slaves were assisted
to freedom was that on becoming free they would be a self-sustaining population,”
he explained.181 “Any legislation that shall imply that they are not expected to attain
175. See Annette Gordon-Reed, Andrew Johnson 72, 80 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & Sean Wilentz

eds., 2011).

176. H.R. 613, 39th Cong. (1866); see also The Freedmen’s Bureau, Nat’l Archives, https://www.archives.

gov/research/african-americans/freedmens-bureau (last visited Mar. 26, 2022); Freedmen’s Bureau Acts of
1865 and 1866, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/
FreedmensBureau.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2022).

177. February 19, 1866: Veto Message on Freedmen and Refugee Relief Bureau Legislation, Miller Ctr., https://

millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/february-19-1866-veto-message-freedmen-andrefugee-relief (last visited Apr. 28, 2022).

178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.

168

VOLUME 66 | 2021/22

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

a self-sustaining condition must have a tendency injurious alike to their character
and their prospects.”182
Thus, among other criticisms Johnson leveled against the Freedmen’s Bureau
bill, he introduced three prescriptive claims that remain in common use today. Those
claims not only justify rejecting government efforts to combat racial discrimination,
but they also provide grounds for insisting that issues of racial discrimination and
inequality should properly be and remain invisible to the law.183
The first claim is that the law should not attempt to prohibit racial discrimination
because the “free market” will, by itself, virtually eliminate such discrimination
automatically.184 “In a world of free access to open markets, systematic discrimination,
even by a large majority, offers little peril to the isolated minority,” law professor
Richard Epstein wrote.185 “Unconstrained by external force, members of minority
groups are free to search for jobs with those firms that do want to hire them.”186 As
the market will remedy virtually everything, there is simply no need for the law—
absent providing remedies for intentional torts—to even recognize race, racial groups,
or racial discrimination.
The second claim is that the law should regard people only as individuals and
judge each person not on his or her membership in some group or class but on
personal and individual “merit.”187 America has a “widely shared commitment to
evaluating individuals upon their individual merit,” Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
declared.188 Justice Scalia made the point even more forcefully. “The relevant
proposition is not that it was [B]lacks, or Jews, or [the] Irish who were discriminated
against,” he insisted, “but that it was individual men and women, ‘created equal,’ who
were discriminated against.”189 Racial “entitlement” of any kind evoked “Nazi

182. Id. Johnson also advanced another argument that often appears in various forms of attack on affirmative

action. He argued that government aid to the freed slaves would lead to “a concentration of power” in
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political ends” and thereby endanger the nation’s democratic form of government. Id.
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Germany,” he declared, and the only ground for legitimate government action was
“individual worth and individual need.”190
The third claim is that governmental actions against de facto racial discrimination
harm the minority groups that the efforts seek to help. “So-called ‘benign’
discrimination teaches many that because of chronic and apparently immutable
handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them without their patronizing
indulgence,” Justice Clarence Thomas wrote.191 Such “programs stamp minorities
with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt
an attitude that they are ‘entitled’ to preferences.”192 The law, then, should neither
combat nor even “see” racial inequalities in social and economic conditions.
However attractive those claims might appear as social or moral ideals, they all
rest on prescriptive abstractions that ill fit the facts of American society. In effect, all
three beg the question of the true nature of race relations in America. Each finds a
way to render irrelevant the actual social conditions that exist and the complex role
that law plays in shaping, supporting, and allowing racially discriminatory practices
and consequences.
The first claim has repeatedly been proven wrong.193 While a truly “free” market
might do wonders for Black Americans, the various de facto markets that exist in the
United States have never been fully and fairly “free” to Blacks.194 Indeed, before the
Civil War, there was a “free market” in slaves,195 evidence of the fact that so-called
“free markets” are always structured by the values and imperatives of the society that
creates, shapes, and honors them. In fact, market practices in America have regularly
and substantially advantaged whites. They enjoyed “profits made from housing
secured in discriminatory markets” and from “insider networks that channel
employment opportunities to the relatives and friends of those who have profited
most from present and past racial discrimination.”196 Most important, whites have
been enormously advantaged in market terms by “intergenerational transfers of
inherited wealth that pass on the spoils of discrimination to succeeding generations.”197
190. Antonin Scalia, Commentary, The Disease as Cure: “In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take

Account of Race,” 1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 147, 153–54.
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All of those factors limit severely the benefits that Blacks can obtain from the
operation of “free market” principles.
The second claim, that the freed slaves had to succeed on their own merits, is
both arbitrary and obscurantist. By definition, it makes “racial” categories illegitimate
regardless of the social facts and conditions that give those categories their operative
significance and determine how evaluations of “worth” and “merit” are actually made
and how their resulting rewards are actually distributed. By denying the role of social
practices and racial biases, the focus on individual “worth” and “merit” willfully
blinds itself to the real-world consequences of group classifications and racial
categories. It denies the reality of race as a social factor that produces seriously
harmful and differential consequences by blinding the nation to the fact that
evaluations of individual merit require at least partially subjective judgments that are
easily and often made through racially biased lenses.198
The third claim, that government aid would be harmful and demeaning to the
freed slaves themselves, is at best excessively overbroad. It assumes a general de facto
racial equality in America that does not exist. Profound racial inequalities continue
to exist and burden Black Americans regardless of their best efforts, and governmental
policies are often largely to blame. Toxic waste facilities are regularly located
primarily in Black neighborhoods,199 for example, while highways and transportation
facilities are regularly built in ways that best serve white communities and
disadvantage Black ones.200
All three claims are not only f lawed but also similarly result-oriented. 201 As
Andrew Johnson immediately understood, each provides a way to erase social
conditions from legal consideration and thereby justifies the principle that de facto
racial discrimination and inequality should be invisible to the law.
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VII. CONCLUSION

“In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race,” Justice Harry
Blackmun maintained in 1978.202 “There is no other way.”203 Some thirty years later
Chief Justice John Roberts disagreed, embracing the concept of “colorblind” law: “The
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race,” he proclaimed, “is to stop discriminating
on the basis of race.”204 While debate between advocates of those two positions
continues, the real-world lesson of “colorblind” law and “colorblind” constitutionalism
seems clear. Blackmun’s position, though fraught with difficulties, at least recognizes
fundamental social and legal truths; Roberts’ position, though sounding noble and
idealistic, strikes me as clueless if not simply disingenuous. The choice between the
two is the choice that Americans have been making for almost four centuries: When
do we wish to have the law “see” race, and when do we wish it to make race invisible?
More important, when and why do we wish the law to do one or the other?
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